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The Legitimacy of Judicial Climate
Engagement
Katrina Fischer Kuh *
Courts in key climate change cases have abdicated their constitutional
responsibility to protect a prejudiced and disenfranchised group (nonvoting
minors and future generations) and remedy an insidious pathology in public
discourse and the political process: the industry-funded climate disinformation
campaign. This Article posits that this abdication results from courts' uneasiness
about displacing the prerogatives of democratically elected bodies. This
uneasiness i misplaced. Court engagement with climate cases would strengthen
democracy in accord with widely accepted justifications for countermajoritarian
judicial review. This Article first describes in detail how courts exhibit a
frustrating reticence to accept jurisdiction over cases that present questions
relating to core climate policy, such as whether large emitters or fossil fuel
producers have common law liability for climate harms and whether the
government has a common law or constitutional duty to address climate change.
In not a single case raising such claims (and they number well over thirty) has a
court permitted the case to proceed to trial. Courts dismiss these claims under
the mantle of a variety ofjusticiability doctrines (standing, political question
doctrine, displacement); these doctrines often serve as vessels for courts to
exercise judicial restraint, and courts' language and reasoning in the climate
cases confirms that the courts are, indeed, motivated by concerns of judicial
overreach. The Article then offers a positive account for why judicial
engagement in the climate cases is consistent with our system ofdemocracy, even
as understood by seminal scholars who define relatively narrow boundaries for
countermajoritarian judicial review. In particular, the Article will situate
arguments for judicial review in climate cases within the work ofJohn Hart Ely,
Jurgen Habermas, and Frank Michelman.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal issues related to climate change can often be comfortably navigated
within existing legal systems and processes, as when courts analyze an
Environmental Impact Statement to determine whether its attention to climate
change satisfies the commands of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).I In some contexts, however, climate change stresses legal doctrines and
norms and surfaces difficult questions about the legitimacy and role of courts.
Decisions in climate litigation brought under the common law of nuisance and
the public trust doctrine reveal the judiciary's deep unease about its role in
developing a societal response to climate change; this uncertainty undergirds the
judiciary's largely hands-off approach. To date, courts have almost uniformly
invoked threshold doctrines like standing, the political question doctrine, and
displacement or preemption to avoid reaching the merits of common law and
constitutional claims.2 As lamented by R. Henry Weaver and Douglas A. Kysar,
1. See, e.g., Idaho Rivers United v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. C14-1800 JLR, 2016 WL
498911, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2016) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the Corps had violated
NEPA by failing to incorporate the impacts of climate change on sediment deposition in its decision
making).
2. E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (dismissing climate
nuisance case as displaced by Clean Air Act); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.
2d 863, 877, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing climate nuisance suit seeking damages for lack of standing
and as presenting a nonjusticiable political question), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming
dismissal on the grounds that climate nuisance suit was displaced by Clean Air Act); Califomia v. Gen.
Motors Corp., C06-05755 Mu, 2007 WL 2726871, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing climate
nuisance suit as presenting a nonjusticiable political question); Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11,
15-17 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing climate trust case), affd sub nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy,
561 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024-25 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2018); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325
F. Supp. 3d 466, 468-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2188 (2d. Cir. July 26, 2018). See
also R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of
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"[b]y hook or by crook, judges have found ways to decline jurisdiction over
extraordinary claims for relief ' 3 because of "jurisdictional anxieties provoked by
climate change litigation." 4 While courts do reach the merits of many climate-
related suits (indeed, the volume of climate-related litigation is extraordinary),5
most of the issues presented reside at the periphery of climate policy. 6 Recall that
even the blockbuster climate case, Massachusetts v. EPA, in the end merely
required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide a "reasoned
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute
to climate change."7 Ultimately, that decision and the authority that it located for
EPA in the Clean Air Act, stands as a roadblock to common law climate relief.
In AEP v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court used this precedent to conclude that
the Clean Air Act displaces at least some substantial portion of federal common
law climate suits.8
Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 295, 323, 356 (2017). The notable exception is Juliana v. United
States, which survived a motion to dismiss and a mandamus petition and is discussed in greater detail
below. See 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1276 (D. Or. 2016). However, motions forjudgment on the pleadings
and summary judgment are pending in that case and any decision will likely be appealed. See also David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence
or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REv. 15, 22, 25 (2012) (reporting on the results of an empirical study
of climate change litigation that "reveals strong indications ofjudicial restraint" and observing that "much
litigation has led to little more than incremental development of law through the courts").
3. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 2, at 356.
4. Id. at 325 (commenting on the "evasiveness [that] has characterized most judicial responses to
climate change torts").
5. The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University maintains a comprehensive
database of U.S. climate change case law: as of June 13, 2018, it included over one thousand actions. U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
AND ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/u-s-litigation-database/ (last
visited June 13, 2018) [hereinafter The Sabin Center].
6. As of June 13, 2018, of the 1,004 cases listed in the Sabin Center database, nearly half involve
important but ancillary (at least to core climate policy) questions arising with respect to environmental
review, securities disclosure, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or other public records requests.
Id. For a thorough empirical assessment of climate change litigation published in 2012, see Markell &
Ruhl, supra note 2. That most of the substantial volume of climate litigation does not speak directly to
core questions of climate policy does not mean that it is without effect or sometimes important:
it is evident at all levels of inquiry that courts have generally resisted litigants' attempts to
make courts a locus of direct policymaking. Nevertheless, the imprint of the courts on climate
policy is substantial, as courts have engaged and decided many important questions. Some
decisions have opened doors to policy making by other institutions, and others have slammed
them shut. Courts may not have established climate change policy directly, but they have
influenced its content and institutional contours dramatically, even as climate change remains
in its infancy.
Id. at 25-26.
7. 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007) (declining to "reach the question whether on remand EPA must
make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it
makes such a finding").
8. 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (holding "that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes
displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel
fired power plants. Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution
subject to regulation under the Act.... And we think it equally plain that the Act 'speaks directly' to
emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants' plants.") (citation omitted).
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This Article argues that courts possess strong claims to democratic
legitimacy in the climate litigation cases as a result of their institutional capacity
to weigh intergenerational harms and responsibly assess scientific claims. Courts
should thus be more willing to engage with central questions of climate policy.
At minimum, they should better and more completely explain and defend their
repeated assertions that the Constitution and democracy demand the judicial
restraint presently exercised. Part II provides a descriptive overview of climate
litigation that (1) demonstrates how courts have sidestepped the core questions
of climate policy and (2) illustrates that this judicial climate avoidance is often
grounded in uneasiness about the legitimacy ofjudicial engagement. Part III then
challenges the reflexive judicial restraint undergirding judicial climate avoidance
by arguing that climate change presents a circumstance where judicial review is
not only consistent with democratic values, but actually enhances our
democracy. The Article concludes with an exhortation to judges to recognize and
more deeply examine the propriety of judicial engagement on core questions of
climate policy and add the judiciary's much-needed voice as our democracy
struggles to respond to this existential challenge.
I. JUDICIAL CLIMATE AVOIDANCE
Climate litigation that intersects with core climate policy advances two
primary theories: (1) that greenhouse gas (GHG)-producing conduct constitutes
a nuisance (or other similar common law tort) by contributing to climate change;
and (2) that governments have a duty under the public trust doctrine and/or the
Constitution to address climate change. Suits grounded in these theories have
been brought by state governments, local governments, land trusts,
environmental groups and other public interest organizations, children, future
generations (represented by a living guardian), trade groups representing
impacted industries, and individuals harmed by climate change. The suits have
been brought against large corporations responsible for significant volumes of
GHG emissions or against governments for failing to regulate or outright
encouraging dangerous fossil fuel use. In terms of relief, the suits have sought
money damages or injunctions against large corporations, or injunctions
requiring federal or state governments to act to reduce GHG emissions. While
these thirty or so cases9 differ greatly in terms of venue, legal theory, and the
identity of the parties, the outcomes are remarkably uniform-4o date, no case
has been tried on the merits. Courts have usually dismissed these cases on
threshold grounds, most often based on the concern that courts should not make
decisions about core climate policy, as that task properly rests with more
democratically accountable institutions, such as elected legislatures.
A review of some of the most important decisions where courts have
invoked threshold doctrines to avoid reaching the merits in cases that concern
9. The Sabin Center, supra note 5.
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core questions of climate policy reveals similarities in reasoning and language
across courts, claims, andjurisdictions. These decisions can be grouped into first-
generation climate nuisance cases (advancing primarily federal common law
nuisance claims), second-generation nuisance cases (styled primarily as state
common law nuisance claims), and constitutional or public trust claims.
A. First-Generation Nuisance Cases
Three of the most notable first-generation climate nuisance cases were
dismissed at the district court level as presenting a political question.
In California v. General Motors, California brought suit seeking damages
from six major automakers, contending that the GHG tailpipe emissions from
their vehicle fleets contributed to a public nuisance: climate change.10 The
district court dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political question,
expressly asserting that the issues raised by the case must be decided by
legislatures and not courts:
[T]he adjudication of Plaintiffs claim would require the Court to balance the
competing interests of reducing global warming emissions and the interests
of advancing and preserving economic and industrial development... . The
balancing of those competing interests is the type of initial policy
determination to be made by the political branches, and not this Court.1 I
The California Attorney General's Office voluntarily dropped its appeal to
the Ninth Circuit, 12 so the district court's dismissal of the case as presenting a
political question stands.
In AEP v. Connecticut, six states, the City of New York, and a collection of
land trusts sued large power companies collectively responsible for 10 percent
of U.S. GHG emissions.13 The plaintiffs argued that the companies' emissions
contributed to a public nuisance-climate change-and sought injunctive relief
via an order requiring the companies to reduce their GHG emissions. The district
court likewise dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political
question, citing EPA statements that it claimed put to rest "any doubt as to the
complexity of the 'initial policy determination[s]' that must be made by the
elected branches before a non-elected court can properly adjudicate a global
warming nuisance claim."l 4 The district court went on to reason:
Because resolution of the issues presented here requires identification and
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests, "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
10. See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007).
11. Id. at *8.
12. See generally Unopposed Mot. to Dismiss Appeal, 3, California v. General Motors, Corp., No.
07-16908 (9th Cir. June 19, 2009) (moving for an order to dismiss a motion to appeal).
13. 564U.S.410(2011).
14. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal
citations omitted), vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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discretion" is required. . . . Indeed, the questions presented here "uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views."..... Thus,
these actions present non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to
the political branches, not the Judiciary.15
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the case did not
present a political question.16 However, the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed
the action, finding that the Clean Air Act had displaced the federal common law
of nuisance in this context.17 While the Court's decision rested on the
displacement doctrine, it also endorsed the propriety of agencies (implementing
legislative commands) as the "first decider" with respect to core climate policy,
in part because of judicial inferiority in navigating "questions of national or
international policy":
[T]his prescribed order of decision[]making-the first decider under the
[Clean Air] Act is the expert administrative agency, the second, federal
judges-is yet another reason to resist setting emissions standards by judicial
decree under federal tort law. The appropriate amount of regulation in any
particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a
vacuum: As with other questions of national or international policy, informed
assessment of competing interests is required. Along with the environmental
benefit potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and the possibility
of economic disruption must weigh in the balance.18
The plaintiffs in Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil likewise found no relief in court.19
Kivalina is a remote Alaskan village located on a barrier island eighty miles
above the Arctic Circle that will likely not be inhabitable for much longer
because sea ice that previously protected the peninsula from erosion and winter
storms has dissipated, leaving the island unprotected.2 0 The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers concluded that the sea is taking over the island, requiring relocation
of its inhabitants.2 1 The villagers of Kivalina sought to recover the costs of their
climate-forced relocation from large energy companies on the grounds that their
emissions contributed to the public nuisance of climate change. And, again, the
district court dismissed the case, this time on standing and nonjusticiable political
15. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
16. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 390-92 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 564
U.S. 410 (2011).
17. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 564 U.S. 410, 421-23 (2011).
18. Id. at 427.
19. See 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
20. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ALASKA DISTRICT, RELOCATION PLANNING PROJECT
MASTER PLAN ES-1 (2006).
21. Id. (noting "[a]n increase in the frequency and intensity of sea storms, degradation and melting
of permafrost, and accelerated erosion of the shoreline have recently forced the village into a state of
emergency. Sea storms have eroded the shoreline out from underneath several structures and threatens the
airstrip. Emergency erosion control measures are in place, but will only slow the sea's inevitable
reclamation of the island. The relocation effort is now critical to the survival of the community.").
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question grounds.2 2 In holding the case was inappropriate for judicial review, the
court asserted that, "Plaintiffs ignore that the allocation of fault-and cost-of
global warming is a matter appropriately left for determination by the executive
or legislative branch in the first instance."23 The Ninth Circuit, applying the
Supreme Court's ruling in AEP v. Connecticut, then held that the action by the
Native Villagers of Kivalina was displaced. In affirming the district court's
dismissal, the Ninth Circuit underscored that its displacement analysis likewise
rested in part on a preference for legislative as opposed to judicial resolution of
climate issues:
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing
domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional
action. That determination displaces federal common law public nuisance
actions seeking damages, as well as those actions seeking injunctive
relief . . . Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which itself is
being displaced by the rising sea. But the solution to Kivalina's dire
circumstance must rest in the hands of the legislative and executive branches
of our government, not the federal common law. 24
The first generation of common law climate nuisance cases were all
dismissed by preliminary dispositive rulings prior to reaching discovery or the
merits.25 These dismissals amount to a precedential minefield for common law
redress of climate harms, but one that a second generation of common law
(primarily nuisance) cases is beginning to navigate.
B. Second-Generation Nuisance Cases
In an effort to avoid displacement under AEP v. Connecticut, the second-
generation common law cases are grounded in state common law, as it remains
unclear whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts state common law claims.
In addition, the cases have been brought against fossil fuel producers, as opposed
to GHG emitters because the Clean Air Act-and hence AEP's displacement
holding-arguably do not reach this conduct. Several local governments,2 6 one
22. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877-83 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
23. Id. at 877.
24. Aative Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
25. See also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff'd,
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
26. See generally Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
appeal docketed sub nom., consol. appeal granted, Nos. 18-15499, 18-15502, 18-15503 (9th Cir.); City
of New York v. BP, P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.
July 26, 2018); Notice of Removal, King Cty. v. BP, P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL, 2018 WL 2440729
(W.D. Wash. May 9, 2018); Bd. of Cty. Commr's of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., No.
18-cv-01672-WJM-SKC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151578 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2019), application fbr stay
denied (U.S. Oct. 22, 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.R.I. 2019),
application for stay denied (U.S. Oct. 22, 2019); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017
(N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2018); City of Imperial Beach v.
Chevron Corp., No. 17-cv-4934 (N.D. Cal.); Cty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv-450 (N.D.
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state,27 and a trade association representing fishermen28 have filed suits against
large energy companies eeking compensation for damages relating to climate
change. These second-generation common law suits allege a number of common
law causes of action but are centered on nuisance claims. Whether these claims
are justiciable remains a hotly contested question. One key threshold question
that has emerged is whether the claims must be understood to sound in federal
common law with important consequences for venue (federal versus state court)
and application of preemption and displacement analysis. District court decisions
have diverged, with two district courts treating the claims as federal common law
claims29 and four district courts treating the claims as state claims;30 appeals are
pending before multiple Circuit Courts of Appeal. As explained below, questions
about the need for judicial restraint and deference to legislative prerogative
feature prominently in analysis of the issue.
The first district court decision in this line of cases, issued on June 25, 2018,
in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., resulted in a dismissal that illustrates the
continued reluctance of courts to reach the merits of core climate claims.3 1
Although the plaintiffs in City of Oakland filed suit in state court alleging
violations of California public nuisance law, the defendants successfully
removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed.32 The district court
understood the cause of action as necessarily sounding in the federal common
law of nuisance and dismissed the suit on the grounds that the case presented
questions better fit for resolution by legislative bodies:
Although the scope of plaintiffs' claims is determined by federal law, there
are sound reasons why regulation of the worldwide problem of global
warming should be determined by our political branches, not by our
judiciary. . . . While it remains true that our federal courts have authority to
fashion common law remedies for claims based on global warming, courts
must also respect and defer to the other co-equal branches of government
when the problem at hand clearly deserves a solution best addressed by those
Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16376 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018); City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 18-cv-458 (N.D. Cal.); City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv-732 (N.D. Cal.); Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538 (D. Md. 2019), appeal docketed No. 19-644
(4th Cir. June 19, 2019), application for stay denied (U.S. Oct. 22, 2019). New cases continue to be filed;
for an up-to-date compilation, see The Sabin Center, supra note 5.
27. See generally Plaintiff's Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I.
Sup. Ct. July 2, 2018) (No. PC-2018-4716) (arguing that the fossil fuel industry knew "for nearly a half
century that unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel products create greenhouse gas pollution
that warms the planet and changes our climate").
28. Notice of Removal by Defendants, Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. 18-cv-07477 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018) (No. 18-cv-07477).
29. City ofOakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1019; City ofNew York, 325 F. Supp. at 468-72.
30. See, e.g., County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937; Board of County Commissioners of
Boulder County, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151578; Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 142;
Mayor & City Council ofBaltimore, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 556.
31. See City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1019.
32. Id. at 1021, 1029.
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branches. The Court will stay its hand in favor of solutions by the legislative
and executive branches.33
Likewise, in City of New York v. BP P.L.C., et al., a federal district court
dismissed New York City's action against a number of fossil fuel companies,
holding that the City's claims sound in federal common law nuisance and are
displaced by the Clean Air Act.34 To the extent that the action sought to recover
for foreign GHG emissions, the district court held that the claims were barred by
the presumption against extraterritoriality and as an interference with the
separation of powers and foreign policy, reasoning:
[T]he immense and complicated problem of global warming requires a
comprehensive solution that weighs the global benefits of fossil fuel use with
the gravity of the impending harms. To litigate such an action for injuries
from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in federal court would severely
infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the
purview of the political branches of the U.S. Government. Accordingly, the
Court will exercise appropriate caution and decline to recognize such a cause
of action.3 5
In County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., which presents claims very
similar to those in City of Oakland v. BP, a district court held that the plaintiffs'
alleged state common law claims were not displaced and should be remanded to
state court.3 6 However, that decision is presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The defendants continue to argue on appeal inter alia that the
case should be removed to federal court and then dismissed, either because
federal common law necessarily governs the local governments' climate change
nuisance claims (and the federal common law has been displaced), or because
the claims, even if understood to present claims sounding in state law, are
completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.37
So far, the second-generation common law nuisance suits are struggling, as
their predecessors did, to convince courts to open their doors to the merits of
33. Id. at 1029.
34. See City of New York v. BP, P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal
docketed, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. July 26, 2018). In both cases, local governments seek damages from fossil
fuel companies in part for contributing to the public nuisance of climate change, although County of San
Mateo also raises claims under products liability, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass. Notably,
three more recent district court decisions in similar cases parallel that ofthe district court in County ofSan
Mateo. See Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151578; Rhode
Island v. Chevron Corp, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 142; Mayor & City Council ofBaltimore, 388 F. Supp. 3d at
556.
35. Id. at 475-76.
36. Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ("[b]ecause
federal common law does not govern the plaintiffs' claims, it also does not preclude them from asserting
the state law claims in these lawsuits. Simply put, these cases should not have been removed to federal
court on the basis of federal common law that no longer exists"), consol. appeal granted, Nos. 18-15499,
18-15502, 18-15503 (9th Cir.).
37. Appellants' Opening Brief, at 13-18, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., Nos. 18-15499, 18-
15502, 18-15503, 18-16376 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2018) (Nos. 18-15499, 18-15502, 18-15503, 18-16376).
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their claims. These decisions make it clear that courts remain uneasy about the
propriety of judicial engagement in this field.
C. Public Trust and Constitutional Cases
Suits against the government seeking to compel more aggressive action on
climate change grounded in the public trust doctrine and constitutional due
process constitute another set of cases that intersect with core climate policy.
These suits have also most often been dismissed on threshold grounds.
A nonprofit organization, Our Children's Trust, organizes and brings
atmospheric trust suits on behalf of children in courts around the world.3 8
Although the precise claims have varied by jurisdiction, they are anchored in the
argument that the government, by failing to adequately respond to climate
change and thus allowing the destruction of the environment necessary to support
and sustain human life, is violating its duty as a trustee of natural resources.39
The atmospheric trust plaintiffs have filed and lost too many suits to relate in
detail but, as with the common law climate nuisance actions, these cases are
typically dismissed on threshold grounds without considering the merits of the
claims.
For example, in Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, Our
Children's Trust partner attorneys, with WildEarth Guardians and a minor,
brought a claim in state court against the State of New Mexico, seeking a
declaration that the state has a duty to regulate GHG emissions under the
common law public trust doctrine. Although the New Mexico Environmental
Improvement Board had adopted GHG regulations under the state Air Quality
Control Act, which the complaint alleged were not sufficiently stringent, the
regulations were subsequently repealed while the case was pending.40 At the
behest of the energy industry, the state environmental agency determined that
"regulating [GHG] enissions in New Mexico 'will have no perceptible impact
on climate change."41 Despite this deregulatory move, the court nonetheless
granted summary judgment to the state, ruling that the issues in the case
demanded a political, not a judicial, decision:
We conclude that the courts cannot independently intervene to impose a
common law public trust duty upon the State to regulate greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere. ... [V]oters have the opportunity to exercise their desire for
political change regarding complex environmental issues at the ballot box
during each election cycle. Therefore, where the State has a duty to protect
38. See Global Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/global-
legal-actions (last visited Aug. 17, 2019).
39. See, e.g., Chernaik v. Brown, 295 Or. App. 584, 586 (2019) (arguing that the State of Oregon
failed to "take sufficient steps to protect the state's public-trust resources from the effects of climate
change.").
40. Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1222, 1223-24 (N.M. Ct. App.
2015).
41. Id. at 1223.
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the atmosphere under Article XX, Section 21 of the New Mexico
Constitution, the courts cannot independently regulate greenhouse gas
emissions in the atmosphere as Plaintiffs have proposed, based solely upon
a common law duty established under the public trust doctrine as a separate
cause of action.4 2
Similarly, in Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, the federal District Court
for the District of Columbia dismissed a suit brought by youth plaintiffs
(partnering with Our Children's Trust) against the U.S. government under the
public trust doctrine seeking to compel the government to take stronger action to
reduce GHG emissions. The court held that there is no federal public trust
doctrine and, even if it existed, it would be displaced by the Clean Air Act. In so
doing, it underscored that legislatures, not courts, should set climate policy:
Ultimately, this case is about the fundamental nature of our government and
our constitutional system, just as much-if not more so-than it is about
emissions, the atmosphere or the climate. Throughout history, the federal
courts have served a role both essential and consequential in our form of
government by resolving disputes that individual citizens and their elected
representatives could not resolve without intervention. And in doing so,
federal courts have occasionally been called upon to craft remedies that were
seen by some as drastic to redress those seemingly insoluble disputes. But
that reality does not mean that every dispute is one for the federal courts to
resolve, nor does it mean that a sweeping court-imposed remedy is the
appropriate medicine for every intractable problem. . . . [T]he issues
presented in this case are not ones that this Court can resolve by way of this
lawsuit ... .43
And, in Kanuk v. State Department of Natural Resources, the Alaska
Supreme Court joined the chorus, dismissing a children's atmospheric trust suit
after concluding that the "limited institutional role of the judiciary supports a
conclusion that the science- and policy-based inquiry here is better reserved for
executive-branch agencies or the legislature."
44
However, Juliana v. United States and other recent cases like it may signal
an increased judicial willingness to adjudicate climate suits.4 5 Our Children's
42. Id. at 1227.
43. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d II, 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Alec L. ex rel.
Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App'x 7. (D.C. Cir. 2014).
44. 335 P.3d 1088, 1099 (Alaska 2014).
45. See Kain v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 479 Mass. 278, 300 (2016); see also Randall S. Abate,
Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline to Justice for Future
Generations?, CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
542, 557 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016) (noting "several state courts have embraced the concept of ATL as
a potential strategy to address climate change regulation in the courts, and it is rapidly gaining support.");
Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, "No Ordinary Lawsuit ": Climate Change, Due Process, and
the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 68-69 (2017) (reasoning that "[plerhaps spurred by
growing evidence of the severity of the climate crisis and the government's clear lack of appropriate
response, courts have begun to discard the displacement, preemption, and political question arguments.")




Trust has won an initial lower court victory that held out hope that the plaintiffs
might finally get their day in court. In Juliana v. United States, environmental
groups, youths and future generations (with Dr. James Hansen46 named as
guardian) sued the U.S. government in federal court, seeking injunctive r lief to
require the government and its agencies to take action to reduce atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations to no more than 350 parts per million. 47 The
plaintiffs grounded their claims in the Fifth Amendment's due process and equal
protection clauses, the Ninth Amendment, and common law public trust
doctrine.4 8 The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss, holding
inter alia that plaintiffs had adequately alleged violation of their fundamental
right to a stable climate system, protected under substantive due process and
informed by the public trust doctrine, and set the case for trial.4 9
The government, however, responded with a barrage of motions and
petitions in a dogged effort to avoid a trial. The United States succeeded shortly
before the trial was set to begin in obtaining a stay and an interlocutory appeal to
the Ninth Circuit.50 The arguments offered by the government in its repeated
salvos should by now sound familiar, grounded as they are in the limited
jurisdiction of the courts to set climate policy. From its initial petition for
mandamus:
This suit is plainly not "consistent with a system of separated powers" . . .as
it seeks to have a federal court decide broad matters of national energy and
environmental policy that are reserved to the elected branches of
government, at the behest of plaintiffs who assert highly generalized injuries
purportedly resulting from a decades-long failure of Congress and the
Executive Branch to adequately address the buildup of C02 in the global
atmosphere.5 1
And from its motion for judgment on the pleadings:
Defendants are ... entitled to judgment on the pleadings because
adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims would violate the separation of powers. At its
most basic level, Plaintiffs' suit is an improper attempt to make and impose
environmental and energy policy writ large through constitutional litigation
under a clause of the Bill of Rights designed to protect true individual
liberties, not the general interests of the citizenry at large. Because
adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims, as currently formulated, would effectively
46. James Hansen has long been a leading climate researcher and advocate. See, e.g., Green Mtn.
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 312-13 (D. Vt. 2007) (reviewing Dr.
Hansen's resume and certifying him as a climate expert).
47. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1248 (D. Or. 2016), mot. to certify appeal
denied, 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017).
48. Id. at 1261.
49. Id. at 1276.
50. Order granting petition for permission to appeal at 335, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176
(9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (No. 18-80176).
51. Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
and Request for Stay of Proceedings in District Court at 12, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-73014 (9th
Cir. June 9, 2017) (No. 18-73014) (citation omitted).
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place this Court in the position of the President or Congress, those claims
should be dismissed.52
From its motion for summary judgment, challenging plaintiffs' standing
and, again, arguing that climate policy issues cannot be decided by courts:
At its most basic level, Plaintiffs' suit is not a Case or Controversy
cognizable under Article III. It is instead an attempt to make energy and
environmental policy through the courts rather than through the political
Branches entrusted by the Constitution with policy making authority.53
And, most recently, from its opening brief in the interlocutory appeal
challenging the district court's denial of its motion for judgment on the pleadings
and summary judgment:
No federal court, nor the courts at Westminster, has ever purported to use the
"judicial Power" to perform such a sweeping policy review - and for good
reason: the Constitution commits to Congress the power to enact
comprehensive government-wide measures of the sort sought by Plaintiffs.
And it commits to the President the power to oversee the Executive Branch
in its administration of existing law and to draw on its expertise to formulate
policy proposals for changing that law. Such functions are not the province
of Article III courts: "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of
powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.". . . The actions that
Plaintiffs' seek to compel are appropriately considered by the legislature and
the executive, not by the courts.54
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, in resolving the
government's applications for stays and petitions for mandamus, signaled
concerns about the case's justiciability. Although the Ninth Circuit denied the
government's application for a writ of mandamus, it observed that it was
"mindful that some of the plaintiffs' claims as currently pleaded are quite broad,
and some of the remedies the plaintiffs seek may not be available as redress."55
And the Supreme Court commented that "[t]he breadth of respondents' claims is
striking .. . and the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for
difference of opinion." 56 Thus, as with the climate nuisance actions, the question
of the propriety ofjudicial review relating to core climate policy remains central
and unresolved in the public trust doctrine (due process) litigation.
Thus far, however, courts have avoided engaging core questions of climate
policy by invoking a range of threshold procedural and jurisdictional rationales
52. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 22, Juliana v. United States, 6:15-cv-
01517-TC (D. Or. May 9, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
53. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-
TC (D. Or. May 22, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
54. Appellant's Opening Brief at 25, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2019)
(citation omitted).
55. In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2018).




grounded wholly or substantially in concerns about the proper and legitimate role
of the judiciary in constitutional democracy. In short, they felt compelled to
exercise judicial restraint.57 This is evidenced by not only the doctrines used to
dispose of the climate cases-standing, the political question doctrine, and
related doctrines are recognized as "methods of substance-avoidance" to weaken
and "render judicial review compatible with democratic theory"58-but also the
language and reasoning used in explaining how courts believe those doctrines
should apply (e.g., "[t]he balancing of those competing interests is the type of
initial policy determination to be made by the political branches, and not this
Court." 59). Courts are thus not only dismissing these cases, but evidencing-
regardless of the specific doctrine applied-a uniform orientation and conviction
that these cases demand judicial restraint.
II. DEMOCRACY-ENHANCING JUDICIAL CLIMATE ENGAGEMENT
Surveying the climate litigation reveals courts' unease about the propriety
ofjudicial influence on climate policy, an unease arising from complex questions
about the legitimacy ofjudicial review itself. Yet courts are not directly or deeply
engaging this question, thereby overlooking important nuance and factors that
support the exercise of judicial review. These decisions echo broader
contemplations about the propriety of judicial review in a constitutional
democracy in light of the countermajoritarian difficulty, which presents "far and
away, the most famous and influential [argument for judicial restraint] in modern
scholarship."6 0
The "difficulty" is that nine, unelected judges possess the power, by
declaring legislation unconstitutional, to override majoritarian will. The judicial
restraint exercised in the climate litigation, as well as the myriad asides about the
proper role of courts in climate policy, track closely the concerns about the
proper distribution of judicial and legislative authority that animate the
57. Blumm & Wood, supra note 45, at 68 (noting "[i]n the context of the ATL campaign, the early
cases demonstrated that some courts were uncomfortable with a role in the climate crisis, particularly in
light of the complex regulatory schemes available to the agencies to regulate greenhouse gas pollution.
As a result, several earlier decisions were dismissed on displacement, preemption, or political question
grounds.") (citations omitted).
58. Nimer Sultany, The State ofProgressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox ofConstitutional
Democracy and the Project ofPolitical Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 371, 409, 415 (2012)
(describing this as "the minimalism of scholars such as Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein") (citing
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 18, 116, 183-98 (2ded. 1986)).
59. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007).
60. Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 785 (1997). It is important to note that the
common law nuisance climate cases do not present a true "countermajoritarian difficulty" as decisions
flowing therefrom would not be constitutional and could be reversed by the legislature; the public trust
doctrine cases, in particular when invoked in conjunction with substantive due process, do present a
circumstance oftrue countermajoritarian difficulty.
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countermajoritarian difficulty. Importantly, however, debates about the
legitimacy and scope of judicial review are enormously complex and remain
contested and unresolved.6 1 Moreover, within that complex and unresolved
theoretical debate reside powerful arguments for judicial review that have
particular salience in the context of climate change. Namely, as argued below,
the judiciary's superior capacity to cognize and respect intergenerational
interests and to appropriately weigh public relations-driven scientific posturing
support the understanding that courts are well-positioned, both as a matter of
institutional competence and constitutional authority, to engage climate disputes.
Courts' uneasiness about their claim to democratic legitimacy to engage
core questions of climate policy influences their assessment of threshold
questions (standing, displacement and preemption, political question) and leads
to some unfortunate consequences. Concerns about judicial aggrandizement and
the need for judicial restraint are not fully developed, as they are only engaged
in the context of applying doctrinal tests for standing or displacement. In so
doing, courts avoid careful exploration of their constitutional authority and
institutional capacities, thus obscuring central questions relating to law and
climate change.62
Indeed, this obscuring is not limited to the climate context. One scholar
observes that labeling judicial actions as countermajoritarian judicial activism
proves "detrimental to the examination of specific legal questions" and "[f]ar
from clarifying the real issues at stake in specific cases, . . . merely obscures
them."63 And while courts typically have avoided direct and thorough
examination of the fear of undue judicial aggrandizement, the concern
nonetheless infuses the relevant doctrinal analysis, contributing to premature
dismissal as courts overweigh the need for judicial restraint in this context. 64 As
61. Sultany, supra note 58, at 454 ("no single theory has hitherto achieved consensus or gained
wide acceptance, and the debate thus far has been inconclusive").
62. In AEP v. Connecticut, for example, the Supreme Court briefly and cursorily lists some aspects
of institutional capacity that suggest agencies are better equipped than courts to set climate policy without
fully exploring the question of institutional competence in this context:
The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing
ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order. . . . Judges
may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for advice, or issue rules
under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested person, or seek the
counsel ofregulators in the States where the defendants are located. Rather,judges are confined
by a record comprising the evidence the parties present. Moreover, federal district judges,
sitting as sole adjudicators, lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other
judges, even members of the same court.
564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
63. Sultany, supra note 58, at 454; see also Adler, supra note 60, at 854-55, 874-92 (critiquing the
unthinking application of democracy- and legislative-centric evaluations of legitimacy grounded in
debates over the countermajoritarian difficulty to the evaluation of court review of agency action and
suggesting the need for more transparency about other institutional rationales for judicial restraint).
64. Undemocratic judicial aggrandizement is highly unlikely in the common law nuisance cases,
as these cases do not present constitutional questions and any judicial decision could be overturned by a
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described below, strong arguments can be offered for judicial engagement-both
as a matter of democratic legitimacy and institutional competence-in cases
presenting questions of core climate policy. 65
Core concerns about the need for judicial restraint simply are not presented
in many climate cases.66 But even when they are, many theorists who advocate
for restraints on judicial review in light of the countermajoritarian difficulty
nonetheless recognize that judicial review is warranted (A) to afford
representation and participation to groups with characteristics similar to those of
minors and future generations vis-A-vis climate change; and (B) to correct for
political process pathologies arguably akin to those that have plagued climate
policy. Together, these considerations support the claim that courts act within
their constitutional authority and in a democracy-enhancing manner when they
engage, rather than sidestep, cases that intersect with climate policy.
A. Cognizance ofIntergenerational Equity
Capacity to attend to the interests of nonvoting minors and future
generations, key stakeholders not represented by present-day majoritarian
policies, supports judicial engagement in core questions of climate policy. There
are strong legal and normative bases for recognizing and respecting
intergenerational equity in the context of climate change. Edith Brown Weiss
famously situated climate change within principles of intergenerational equity in
1987, reasoning that "conservation of options (defined as conserving the
diversity of the natural and cultural resources base), conservation of quality
(defined as leaving the planet no worse off than received), and conservation of
access (defined as equitable access to the use and benefits of the legacy)" require
legislature; the cases are not constitutional, are reversible, and do not directly present a countermajoritarian
difficulty in the traditional sense. See Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public
Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1827, 1866 (2008) (arguing that climate nuisance
suits are legitimate and observing that "because public nuisance litigation derives from the common law,
the legislature can overturn it whenever it wishes . . . ."). Moreover, common law tort can also be
understood as a majoritarian device. See Weaver & Kysar, supra note 2, at 312, 314 (noting "[tihe
pronouncements of tort law are majoritarian because tort understands itself to enforce collective standards
of conduct, even if courts are not directly responsive to electoral results" and "the democratic privilege of
the legislature is not so profound as it might initially seem. Though less directly representative, courts
deploying tort law nevertheless express majoritarian commitments.").
65. Of note, some scholars argue that judicial restraint is warranted in climate litigation, invoking
different theories about the role of courts in democracy. Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the
Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S. CAL. L. Rev. 201, 231
(2010) (invoking Peter Schuck's work on the role of courts to argue that "[c]limate change and the other
public health problems prompting public interest ort actions are the society-wide harms our constitutional
structures suggest the political branches should handle."). The analysis that follows does not claim that
all theories offered for resolving the countermajoritarian difficulty support judicial climate engagement.
The analysis instead shows that some core justifications forjudicial review within the large body of theory
contemplating the countermajoritarian difficulty support court engagement, suggesting that further
analysis is warranted before courts reflexively exercise judicial restraint.
66. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. But see Gifford, supra note 65, at 206-07 (arguing
forjudicial restraint in climate tort actions).
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"measures to prevent rapid changes in climate, measures to prevent or mitigate
damage from climate change, and measures to assist countries in adapting to
climate change."67
The anemic policy response to climate change, coupled with observations
revealing that projections about the timing and severity of key climate change
impacts have been conservative,68 suggest that these principles of
intergenerational equity will not be respected. Yet the facts, timelines, and
mechanics of climate change reveal a uniquely strong imperative to respect
intergenerational equity in the climate context. Present levels of emissions pose
existential threats if unchecked, delay in reducing emissions locks in statistically
certain death, and also exponentially increases the difficulty of achieving future
reductions adequate to reign in serious climate harms.6 9 That climate change
presents an unusually compelling case for valuing intergenerational equity
suggests that climate exceptionalism-adopting a legal approach to climate
change that is specific to the issue of climate change, thereby defusing to some
extent slippery slope arguments-is possible.
Consideration of the interests of future generations in environmental policy,
including specifically within the context of climate change, finds ample support
within international environmental law, the corpus of U.S. environmental
statutes, the common law, and arguably the U.S. Constitution. The United States
is a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which endorses intergenerational equity vis-a-vis climate change, asserting in
Article 3, paragraph 1: "The Parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity .
. . ."70 Many domestic environmental statutes require the consideration of the
interests of future generations, including NEPA, which declares a national policy
"to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations."71 It further states that it is the "continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the
end that the Nation may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations."72 Numerous courts have
held that in some contexts NEPA mandates assessment of an action's
67. Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and International Law, 9 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. 619, 622-23 (2008).
68. See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Oceans are Warming Faster than Predicted, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/oceans-are-warming-faster-than-predicted/.
69. See generally DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH: LIFE AFTER WARMING
(2019) (discussing the impacts of global warming, including food shortages, climate wars, and economic
catastrophe).
70. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
art. 3(1).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2019).
72. Id. § 4331(b).
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contribution to climate change (through, for example, an increase in GHG
emissions), even though climate impacts will not be immediate.73
Additionally, climate-specific domestic statutes recognize the need to
consider long-term climate impacts most relevant to future generations. For
example, while recognizing that "the consequences of the greenhouse effect may
not be fully manifest until the next century," the Global Climate Protection Act
of 1987 nonetheless exhorts that "[n]ecessary actions must be identified and
implemented in time to protect the climate."74 The Global Change Research Act
of 1990 similarly mandates the preparation of a scientific report every four years
that "analyzes current trends in global change . .. for the subsequent 25 to 100
years."75
Common law doctrines likewise exhibit concern for long-term impacts. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies conduct hat has "produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect" as a circumstance that supports finding an unreasonable
interference with a public right (so as to give rise to a public nuisance).76 The
Second Circuit in Connecticut v. AEP had no difficulty concluding that
allegations that "emissions constitute continuing conduct that may produce a
permanent or long[-]lasting effect" stated a public nuisance.7 7 And the public
trust doctrine clearly imagines both existing and future publics as beneficiaries
of those resources held in trust by the sovereign. The Supreme Court has
recognized that some "property is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
in trust for the public."78 While the contours and origins of the public trust
doctrine are disputed, as is its potential application to climate change, the public
trust concept is rooted in the idea of preserving natural resources in trust for
future generations.79 In Juliana v. United States, Judge Aiken held that public
trust concepts are made enforceable through the substantive due process clause,
which can be understood to encompass a fundamental right to "a climate system
capable of sustaining human life." 8 0
73. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2008) (noting "[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of
cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.").
74. Global Climate Protection Act, Pub. L. 100-204, tit. XI, § 1102(4), 101 Stat. 1407 (1987) (note
following 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2019)).
75. United States Global Change Research Program, Pub. L. 101-606, tit. I, § 106(3), 104 Stat.
3101 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2936 (2019)).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. L. INST. 1979).
77. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (reasoning that "[tihe States have additionally asserted that the emissions
constitute continuing conduct that may produce a permanent or long lasting effect, and that Defendants
know or have reason to know that their emissions have a significant effect upon a public right, satisfying
§ 821 B(2)(c). We hold that the States, in their parens patriae and proprietary capacities, have properly
alleged public nuisance under Restatement § 821B, and therefore have stated a claim under the federal
common law of nuisance as it incorporates the Restatement's definition of public nuisance.").
78. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
79. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1970).
80. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
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The application of intergenerational equity in the context of climate change
has been more fully explored by other scholars.8 ' It is also quite clear that our
body of environmental laws is designed to protect the health and welfare of
current children-part of the disenfranchised intergenerational minority with
respect to climate change.
In short, it seems reasonable to assert that the future impacts of climate
change at minimum ought to be considered when evaluating climate law and
policy-even when those impacts primarily affect nonvoting minors and future
generations. Perhaps the best way to appreciate the force of the argument is to
consider the difficulty of defending the opposing position: that decisions today
about the combustion of fossil fuels and other GHG-emitting activities need not
consider the impacts of climate change on future generations
1. Courts are a (relatively) good institutional choice for respecting
intergenerational interests.
Just climate policy should cognize and value intergenerational interests.
And there are reasons to believe that courts may be better positioned than the
more democratically accountable branches to meaningfully weigh these interests
in the context of climate change. Courts, as a matter of relative institutional
competence, can be expected to more consistently respect intergenerational
equity than the legislative or executive branches, who have systematically
undervalued intergenerational interests related to climate change in the political
process. The claim here is not that courts are particularly good at weighing
intergenerational climate interests, only that they are likely to be somewhat better
than the political branches, which we would predict (and experience has borne
out) are unlikely to be sufficiently attendant to them.
Political process features, coupled with human cognitive tendencies and
sociological biases make it very difficult for our political system to produce
equitable climate policy.82 Climate change demands that the existing voting
majority choose to endure certain mitigation costs to prevent uncertain future
harms to nonvoting minors and future generations:
81. See, e.g., PETER LAWRENCE, JUSTICE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014) (discussing the issue of intergenerational climate justice); James C. Wood,
Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 293, 298-300 (1996)
(discussing the norm of intergenerational equity as "fairness across generations, which imposes
obligations on living generations to consider the interests of future generations").
82. These difficulties have previously been explained at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Richard J.
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1161 (2009) (identifying features of climate change, human nature, and political
systems that "present significant obstacles both to the enactment of climate change legislation in the first
instance and to its successful implementation over time"); Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits
of the Possible, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 289, 289-98 (2008) (noting that "[iut might seem, then,
that climate change is the Achilles heel of modem political economy, a problem whose spatial and
temporal scale produces overwhelming externalities and confounds political efforts to address them.").
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[T]here will necessarily be a huge lag between the time reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions occur and any mitigating effect on climate change.
The time lag is at the very least longer than the lifetime of any adult. The
upshot is that no one who is asked to curtail activities to reduce greenhouse
gas concentrations will be likely to live long enough to enjoy the benefits of
that curtailment.8 3
In other words, the harms we avoid by taking mitigation action now are
uncertain. Their extent and form cannot be precisely predicted. Moreover, our
mitigation actions may fail to appreciably reduce climate harms if other
jurisdictions do not likewise take action. And, of course, these uncertain future
harms accrue largely to the benefit of others.84 That sacrifices to achieve
mitigation now can produce any benefits only far in the future provides little
incentive for politicians (whose political careers will by then be long expired) to
focus on climate action.8 5
Another factor preventing emissions control from gaining public salience is
our weak understanding of the correlation between GHG emissions and specific
climate harms.86 Without the ability to directly attribute climate events to GHG
emissions, let alone trace them to specific emissions, individuals lack the
motivation to credit and seek to address a risk.87 The human mind not only
struggles to recognize climate change as an urgent risk, but is predisposed to
heavily value the here and now over the distant future, a trait that may be related
to the fact that "concern about the distant future has had no selective value during
human evolution."88 It is thus an uphill effort to adopt climate policy in light of
the above-described mismatches between the attributes of climate change, our
political system, and our human cognitive capacities.
Another significant obstacle is the fact that the industries opposed to climate
mitigation are among the most well-funded, powerful, and sophisticated in the
world.89 In addition to using traditional channels of influence to forestall climate
regulation, such as campaign contributions and lobbying, fossil fuel interests
attack the underlying science to prevent the development of public, and hence
political, pressure to address the problem. They successfully exploit yet another
human cognitive attribute-the tendency to discount facts that contradict the
preferred cultural world view90-to orchestrate a climate disinformation
83. Lazarus, supra note 82, at 1167.
84. Purdy, supra note 82, at 294-95.
85. Id. at 294-95.
86. Jason J. Czarnezki et. al., Crafting Next Generation Eco-Label Policy, 48 ENVTL. L. 409, 429
(2018) (discussing the "tendency of the human mind to disregard impalpable concerns, problems that are
diffuse in effect and are not directly experienced by our senses").
87. Purdy, supra note 82, at 296.
88. Czarnezki, supra note 86, at 429.
89. Lazarus, supra note 82, at 1185.
90. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of-and




campaign that has helped to forestall the development of public and political will
to adopt climate policy.9 1
Thus, the attributes of climate change combine with political process
features and human psychology to render present-day, majoritarian political
commitment to mitigate unusually difficult. In the words of one scholar, "climate
change law is no less than environmental lawmaking's worst nightmare ....
[t]he combination of the science of climate change and human nature perversely
triggers obstacle after obstacle."9 2 Yet, the intergenerational stakes in avoiding
or delaying mitigation are unusually high, and "lawmaking delays are costly,"93
perhaps existentially so. Delay inexorably increases the severity of unavoidable
climate harms,94 which "preclude[s] the normal luxury of awaiting serious and
immediate adversity before taking action." 95 Indeed, inaction and delay increase
the risk of catastrophic climate harms that threaten human civilization. There are
thus reasons to believe that we are individually and politically hardwired to short
the needs of children and future generations, particularly in the context of climate
change, even though it is imperative to act now.
While the political process may be uniquely unsuited for addressing
intergenerational climate interests, what, if anything, makes courts better? Courts
are able to sidestep some of the challenges climate change presents to the
political process. Unelected justices and judges are not as sensitive to the here
and now demands of the majority and are not subject to the same political
pressures and political time horizons as elected officials, arguably freeing them
to consider the interests of children and future generations.96
91. See, e.g., Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Challenging Climate Change: The Denial
Countermovement in CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 300-32 (Dunlap &
Brulle eds. 2015).
92. Lazarus, supra note 82, at 1184.
93. Id. at 1168.
94. Id. at 1164-68 (explaining the stock/flow nature ofatmospheric chemistry).
95. Id at 1172.
96. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 88 (1980)
(explaining that representation-reinforcing judicial review "involves tasks that courts, as experts on
process and (more important) political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to
perform than political officials"); see also id. at 103 ("Appointed judges .. . are comparative outsiders in
our governmental system, and need worry about continuance in office only very obliquely.... [This]
put[s] them in a position objectively to assess claims- . . . that either by clogging the channels of change
or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the
interests of those whom the system presupposes they are") and 151 (explaining that "[tihe whole point of
the approach [allowing countermajoritarian judicial review to benefit certain minority groups] is to
identify those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in
attending. If the approach makes sense, it would not make sense to assign its enforcement to anyone but
the courts."); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988) ("Judges perhaps enjoy
a situational advantage over the people at large in listening for voices from the margins. Judges are perhaps
better situated to conduct a sympathetic inquiry into how, if at all, the readings of history upon which
those voices base their complaint can count as interpretations of that history-interpretations which,
however re-collective or even transformative, remain true to that history's informing commitment to the
pursuit of political freedom through jurisgenerative politics.") (internal citation omitted).
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Some evidence of the judicial capacity to value the interests of future
generations may be gleaned from the decisions of state courts that applied state
constitutional environmental right or public trust provisions. Notable state court
decisions from Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawai'i show how courts can
effectively identify and value the interests of future generations, at least in the
context of interpreting and applying these state constitutional provisions (which
often explicitly command considering future generations).
For example, Pennsylvania's Environmental Rights Amendment instructs
that "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come."9 7 In Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a plurality decision,
invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment in striking down a state law that
would have overridden local zoning in order to compel communities to accept
oil and gas operations.98 Speaking directly to the difficulty of respecting the
interests of future generations, the court acknowledged the democratic bias
toward the current generation and chided the state, going forward, to be more
mindful of long-term environmental consequences. It observed that "[i]n
undertaking its constitutional cross-generational analysis, the Commonwealth
trustee should be aware of and attempt to compensate for the inevitable bias
toward present consumption of public resources by the current generation,
reinforced by a political process characterized by limited terms of office." 9 9
Moreover, in describing the history that led to the adoption of the Environmental
Rights Amendment and comparing it to modem-day shale gas exploitation, the
court expressly embraced the idea of the judiciary as a backstop, protecting the
interests of future generations against a democratically elected legislature bent
on short-term extraction. The plurality began by referencing the environmental
harms from coal extraction, characterizing them as motivated by the prospect of
short-term economic gain:
Pennsylvania has a notable history of what appears retrospectively to have
been a shortsighted exploitation of its bounteous environment .... When
coal was "King," there was no Environmental Rights Amendment to
constrain exploitation of the resource, to protect the people and the
environment, or to impose the sort of specific duty as trustee upon the
Commonwealth as is found in the Amendment. Pennsylvania's very real and
mixed past is visible today to anyone travelling across Pennsylvania's
spectacular, rolling, varied terrain.. . . [T]he landscape bears visible
scars ... as reminders of the past efforts of man to exploit Pennsylvania's
natural assets.10 0
It then likened historical, unchecked coal extraction to modem-day
fracking. The court characterized these activities as failures of democratic
97. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
98. Robinson Twp., Washington Cty. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 (2013).
99. Id. at 659 n.46.
100. Id. at 686-87.
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decision making that prejudice the interests of future generations and (with
respect to fracking) are properly corrected by courts under the Environmental
Rights Amendment:
The type of constitutional challenge presented today is as unprecedented in
Pennsylvania as is the legislation that engendered it. But, the challenge is in
response to history seeming to repeat itself: an industry, offering the very
real prospect ofjobs and other important economic benefits, seeks to exploit
a Pennsylvania resource, to supply an energy source much in demand. The
political branches have responded with a comprehensive scheme that
accommodates the recovery of the resource. By any responsible account, the
exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will produce a detrimental
effect on the environment, on the people, their children, and future
generations, and potentially on the public purse, perhaps rivaling the
environmental effects of coal extraction.10 1
And, notably, the plurality readily rejected the "Commonwealth's efforts to
minimize the import of this litigation by suggesting it is simply a dispute over
public policy voiced by a disappointed minority," observing that "Act 13 has the
potential to affect the reserved rights of every citizen of this Commonwealth
now, and in the future."1 02
Similarly, in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality, the Montana Supreme Court again weighed
intergenerational interests when confronting democratic approval for action that
would result in short-term financial gain from resource extraction but impose
long-term environmental consequences.10 3 Invoking the environmental rights in
Montana's constitution (which include inter alia that "[tihe State and each person
shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for
present and future generations"' 04), the Montana Supreme Court voided as
unconstitutional a legislative exemption from certain water quality standards as
applied to the approval of a massive, proposed gold mine to be located near the
Blackfoot River. 0 5
And in Hawai'i, where state constitutional environmental rightS' 06 are
melded with the state's common law public trust doctrine, the Supreme Court
interprets these authorities to create "a ... duty to .. . future generations"107 and
101. Id.
102. Id. at 976-77.
103. Mont. Envtl. Ctr. v. Dept. Envtl. Quality, 296 Mont. 207, 231 (1999).
104. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
105. The legislative exemption may have been obtained by mining interests with an eye to obtaining
approval for operation of this particular mine. RICHARD MANNING, ONE ROUND RIVER 178 (1996) ("In
Montana, mining money had built the corridors of power, and it was no real trick for it to walk the halls
again. Industry lobbyists sought and got a relaxation in the state's water quality laws... . [Tihe changes
relaxed standards for arsenic alone, and the McDonald mine, unlike most others, has a specific arsenic
problem. The new law had McDonald's [the gold mine proponent] fingerprints on it.").
106. HAW. CONST. art. Xl, § I ("For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its
political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources.").
107. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 674 (1982).
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insists that agencies act accordingly: "When an agency is confronted with its duty
to perform as a public trustee under the public trust doctrine, it must preserve the
rights of present and future generations ... ."108
2. Courts have strong claims to legitimacy when protecting intergenerational
interests.
Of course, the same insulation from democratic pressures that frees courts
to value the interests of future generations is also the source of concern about the
propriety of court intervention. The doctrines that courts use to sidestep
engagement with core questions of climate policy (political question doctrine,
displacement and preemption, standing) are all doctrines designed in part to
ensure that the judiciary does not overstep its constitutionally defined role in our
democracy. If courts lack the authority (or should, as an exercise of judicial
restraint, decline to assert the authority) to hear cases or render decisions that,
directly or indirectly, set climate policy because that is the province of the
legislature and executive, then it is perhaps irrelevant that courts would be better
at valuing the interests of future generations.
Notably, although courts may make it sound as though these sidestepping
doctrines compel them to dismiss a case, the doctrines are largely prudential, or
at least the standards for their application are sufficiently flexible that outcomes
can be understood to largely reflect a normative assessment of the "proper" role
for courts.109 As shown above, courts in the climate cases have repeatedly
evinced uneasiness about the proper role for the judiciary and this uneasiness
infuses analysis of whether, when, and how the sidestepping doctrines are
applied. Additionally, resolution of the merits of claims in the public trust/due
process cases more directly raises questions about judicial restraint as courts are
asked to declare government action (or inaction) unconstitutional.110
It is thus important to directly confront questions about the propriety of
judicial review vis-A-vis core climate policy. Explanations as to why judicial
review is consistent with constitutional democracy may help to inform normative
assessments of the propriety of court engagement under the sidestepping
doctrines and more substantive inquiry under the due process clause. Courts
invoke the sidestepping doctrines and feel compelled to defer to climate-
unfriendly law out of a need to respect majority democratic (legislative)
prerogative. It may thus be useful to remind courts of circumstances in which
108. Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n ofCty. ofKaua'i, 133 Haw. 141, 173 (2014).
109. For example, one scholar (taking the view that courts should not engage on core climate
questions because it is inconsistent with judicial competency and separation of powers), exhorts courts to
avail themselves of "doctrinal exit ramps" in climate litigation, and observes that "[j]udicial restraint
doctrines arose in contexts other than common law tort actions between private parties," but argues that
"the avant-garde nature of public interest tort litigation warrants the principled extension of standing and
political question doctrines beyond their prior applications." Gifford, supra note 65, at 232-33, 259.
110. E.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13-15 (D.D.C. 2012), affd sub nom. Alec L. ex
rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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scholars have argued (and sometimes courts have held) that the judiciary is
understood to enhance democracy and act consistent with its constitutional role
even when contradicting the majority-and to demonstrate that these
circumstances may often be present in the context of climate change. One
influential rationale1 1 for why and when judicial override is consistent with
representative democracy is when courts act to protect participation and
representation in the political process, in particular vis-id-vis a prejudiced
minority (children and future generations in the climate context).112
Professor John Hart Ely posits that judicial review can be consistent with
representative democracy, even when judges are engaged in the most
countermajoritarian of tasks. As long as courts interpret the Constitution in a
representation-reinforcing manner, using open-ended constitutional provisions
to strike down a statute as unconstitutional does not run afoul of democratic
principles. This is so because the Constitution values participation and
representation. Thus when courts interpret the Constitution so as to protect
processes that ensure that those values are satisfied, they can do so in a manner
consistent with the constitutional text without imposing judicial values on the
111. Scholars and jurists offer numerous justifications forjudicial review, as well as claim that there
is no tension between democracy and judicial review or, alternatively, that the tension between judicial
review and democracy cannot be resolved. E.g., Sultany, supra note 58, at 388 (setting out a typology of
the debate over constitutionalism and democracy). I seek here to note only that some important theories
justifying judicial review that have been widely recognized as significant (even if not definitive) may help
build the case for judicial review in the context of core climate policy.
112. See generally ELY, supra note 96, (defending participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
judicial review); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).Ofnote, others
have asserted, without exploring in-depth, that children and future generations should be afforded special
solicitude in climate and constitutional analysis. See Mia Hammersley, The Right to A Healthy and Stable
Climate: Fundamental or Unfounded?, 7 ARIz. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 117, 140, 143 (2017) (noting that
"children could arguably be considered a suspect class for purposes of the equal protection component of
due process in the context of climate change. Children as a class have not been historically persecuted like
other classes based on race or sexual orientation. Nevertheless, children are politically vulnerable by
definition; they cannot vote. . . . Due to these concems of intergenerational inequality, the Climate Kids
arguably may be a protected class entitled to elevated scrutiny" and "[fjootnote Four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co. states that legislation that restricts political processes, contradicts enumerated
fundamental rights, or discriminates against minorities may be subject to greaterjudicial scrutiny, and that
the court system is well equipped to step in to correct prejudice, particularly against minority groups,
where the legislative branch fails to do so. Here, the legislative branch has failed to protect future
generations from the impacts of climate change."); see also Melissa K. Scanlan, The Role of the Courts in
Guarding Against Privatization of Important Public Environmental Resources, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 237, 277-79 (2018) (arguing that "in a nature's trust case, the understanding of separation of
powers is informed by the judiciary's proper role as supervising the political branches carrying out trust
duties; and that role is heightened in the context of youth and future generations who are part of a vote-
less diffuse majority" and "[i]n cases involving nature's trust, the judicial branch plays a critical role in
ensuring the political branch trustees are protecting the beneficiaries' interests. When the rights of future
generations are at stake, who of course have no political representation, a bar to the courts based on
political question grounds is misplaced."); Lazarus, supra note 82, at 1187 (recommending
precommitment strategies for climate legislation that would "limit[ ] the ability of future legislators and
officials to undermine the statute's implementation" and observing that "[cloncerns one might otherwise
have about the antidemocratic effects of such lawmaking restraints should be reduced by the need for
those kinds of restraints to preserve options for future generations.").
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majority in an unwarranted countermajoritarian fashion.113 Courts, on this view,
should adopt an approach to constitutional adjudication that "rather than dictate
substantive results . . . intervenes when the 'market,' in our case the political
market is systematically malfunctioning." 1 4 As explained by Ely:
[m]alfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the
ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will
stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a
voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby
denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system.11 5
Roughly speaking, both types of malfunction can be said to occur vis-a-vis
children and future generations in the context of climate change. First, and most
simply, children and future generations cannot vote. Their status can be
compared to that of out-of-state residents impacted by in-state economic policies.
In explaining and endorsing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause to bar discrimination against out-of-state residents, Ely observes that this
is consistent with the Constitution's concept of representation. According to Ely,
the Court uses "virtual representation" (aligning the interests of nonvoting
nonresidents with voting in-state residents) to prevent inequalities against
nonresidents, "a paradigmatically powerless class politically." 11 6 While minors
and future generations cannot vote on many matters that ultimately impact them,
climate change presents an unusual and exceptional case. Climate change
presents a lock-in of extraordinary and likely irreversible conditions occasioned
by the voting in-generation acting narrowly in its own self-interest without input
from the nonvoting out-generations in a manner similar to discrimination against
nonresidents.
Second, as in cases where courts have sought to protect politically
disadvantaged minorities, children and future generations may be considered to
have a unique stake in climate change litigation that warrants judicial protection.
Children and future generations likely cannot be understood to constitute a
prejudiced or "discrete and insular minority" in the traditional or doctrinally
recognized sense.1 17 However, aspects of their relationship to the political
113. See ELY, supra note 96, at 73-104.
114. Id. at 102-03.
115. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original).
116. Id.at83.
117. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness A Requirement for Heightened Equal
Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10 (2010) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated three
requirements for suspect classifications: (1) the class defined by the classifying trait must be a coherent
social group, (2) the class must have suffered from a history of state discrimination based upon the
classifying trait, and (3) the classifying trait must be a factor that generally does not contribute to legitimate
public policies."); see also Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1988) ("No cases have
ever held, and we decline to hold, that children are a suspect class."); see also Juliana v. United States,
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process and their underrepresented climate interests nonetheless resonate with
central reasons offered for court intervention to protect more conventionally
acknowledged prejudiced minorities. The application of strict scrutiny for
suspect classifications has been defended (from a countermajoritarian critique)
as a means to make sure that certain groups are not unduly prevented from
achieving representation through the political process as a result of prejudice that
derails "the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend those
overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a given issue," thus
constituting "cooperation-blocking prejudice." 118
"The facts that all of us once were young, and most expect one day to be
fairly old" has been wrongly assumed to "neutralize whatever suspicion we
might otherwise entertain respecting the multitude of laws (enacted by
predominately middle-aged legislatures) that comparatively advantage those
between, say, 21 and 65, over those who are younger or older.", 19 In
Massachusetts Board ofRetirement v. Murgia, the Supreme Court ruled that age-
based classifications are not suspect, in part because all of us look forward to old
age; hence, there is no need for the "extraordinary protection" of heightened
judicial review:
But even old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group in need of
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span. Even
if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the
aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial
scrutiny. 120
This reasoning, however, fails in the context of climate change where the
voting in-generation lacks the capacity to comprehend or adequately value the
climate change that their decisions lock in for nonvoting minors and future
generations. There is ample reason to be suspicious of the in-generation's
motives and little basis to trust that they will empathize with the plight of future
generations. There is most certainly prejudice that blocks cooperation between
the voting in-generation and those to follow. As explained above, a host of
339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1103 (D. Or. 2018) (invoking slippery slope arguments in rejecting Juliana
plaintiffs' claim that minors and future generations warrant treatment as a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause: "Holding that 'posterity' or even just minor children are a suspect class would
hamstring governmental decision-making, potentially foreclosing even run-of-the mill decisions such as
prioritizing construction of a new senior center over construction of a new playground or allocating state
money to veterans' healthcare rather than to the public schools. Applying strict scrutiny to every




120. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938)) (citation omitted).
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cognitive, psychological, and evolutionary factorsl21 make it extraordinarily
difficult for the voting in-generation to cognize, act upon, and cooperate to
consider the interests of nonvoting minors and future generations in the context
of climate change.
What is perhaps most notable about Ely's participation-representation
justification for countermajoritarian judicial review is that it adopts a relatively
narrow understanding of the appropriate scope of judicial review. 122 That
powerful arguments for judicial review in the context of climate change reside
within his theory is thus particularly compelling.
B. Discerning Scientific Posturing
Another claim offered in support of judicial review-that
countermajoritarian judicial review supports democracy when used to correct
pathologies in the political process-is likewise salient in the context of climate
change because courts can help temper dysfunction occasioned by the climate
disinformation campaign.
Plaintiffs in climate change cases have alleged (and researchers have
documented) purposeful distortions of public communication and, by extension
democratic process, by fossil fuel interests intent on deferring or avoiding laws
requiring emission reductions. The causes of action in the climate nuisance suits
(in particular, the second-generation climate nuisance suits, but the Kivalina case
as well) are intertwined with allegations about how energy companies
strategically manipulated public opinion and political debate through a climate
disinformation campaign.123 That corporate energy interests funded and
otherwise supported an involved public relations campaign to spread
disinformation and sow doubt about climate science has been well-
documented.124 These corporate interests purposefully introduced and promoted
(dis)information about climate science into public fora that internal documents
121. The force of these difficulties is usefully illustrated by the fact that climate change struggles to
find salience as a threat justifying action even among present-day parents-many of whom would likely
jump in front of a bus for their children.
122. Many scholars reject the tension between constitutionalism and democracy in the first instance
or offer theories justifying judicial review in light of that tension that rest on broader bases than that
offered by Ely. Sultany, supra note 58, at 388.
123. See, e.g., Complaint at47-61, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d849 (9th
Cir. 2012) (No. 09-17490) (setting forth allegations in support of civil conspiracy complaint); Complaint
at 34-65, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron, 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-15499)
(describing climate disinformation campaign and bringing failure to warn claim), consol. appealgranted,
Nos. 18-15499, 18-15502, 18-15503 (9th Cir.).
124. E.g., Dunlap & McCright, supra note 91, at 300-32; UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR: How EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO'S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE
UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 1 (2007), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files
legacy/assets/documents/global-warming/exxon-report.pdf; see also NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M.
CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT (2010). InsideClimate News also published investigative articles
documenting the disinformation campaign in its series. See Neela Banerjee et al., Exxon: The Road Not
Taken (Sept. 16, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken.
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reveal they knew to be false or misleading.12 5 And this disinformation
intersected with human cognitive tendencies to conform facts to cultural
worldview and engage in politically motivated reasoningl2 6 to stoke a
stalemating, ideological churn of unproductive public "debate" about climate
science.
A 2002 memorandum to Republican candidates prepared by political
strategist Frank Luntz illustrates well the nexus between the manufactured debate
on climate science "uncertainty" and public and political dialogue.127 Mr. Luntz
recommends that candidates focus on uncertainty in climate science to explain
opposition to climate regulation to voters, while simultaneously recognizing that
to do so does not accurately portray the state of the science:
Voters believe that there is no consensus about global warming within the
scientific community. Should the public come to believe that the scientific
issues are settled, their views about global warming will change accordingly.
Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a
primary issue in the debate .... The scientific debate is closing [against us]
but not yet closed. There is still a window of opportunity to challenge the
science. . . . You need to be even more active in recruiting experts who are
sympathetic to your view ... 128
Gallup public opinion polling on climate change in the United States shows
that Americans grew more skeptical and less concerned about climate change
even as scientific understanding deepened.129 The percentage of Americans
believing that global warming is caused by pollution from human activities
"dropped sharply in 2010," the number of climate skeptics grew between 2008
and 2010, and public concern about climate change "dampened" from 2009 to
2015. Gallup hypothesizes that these trends are attributable in part to the "well-
publicized pushback against global warming science"1 3 0 and to "the high profile
'Climategate' controversy that emerged in late 2009, raising questions about the
objectivity of some leading climate science researchers, as well as the legitimacy
of some of their findings."]31
It seems likely that the climate disinformation public relations campaign,
and the disputes about climate science that it continues to engender, impacted
public opinion and political debate, which slowed (if not stymied) the domestic
125. Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate Change Communications
(1977-2014), 12 ENVTL. RES. LETrERS 1, at 12-15 (2017).
126. Kahan, supra note 90, at 3-6.
127. Frank Luntz, The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America, THE LUNTZ RESEARCH
COMPANIES, 131-46 (2002), https://www.motherjones.com/files/LuntzResearch-environment.pdf
128. Id. at 137-38 (emphasis in original).
129. See Lydia Saad, One in Four in U.S. Are Solidly Skeptical of Global Warming, GALLUP (Apr.
22, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/polll 68620/one-four-solidly-skeptical-global-warming.aspx






political response to climate change.13 2 The climate disinformation campaign
was detailed at length in the Kivalina complaint and, in so doing, "the plaintiffs
[effectively] asked the court to find that the political branches had been duped,
that the defendants' actions had compromised democracy itself." 1 33
But what does this say about the role for courts? We generally do not view
courts as a good institutional fit for evaluating complex scientific claims, tending
to view this as the province of expert agencies. Courts are, however, an excellent
forum for weeding out pseudoscience that doesn't pass minimum standards of
credibility (Daubert), like public relations-directed scientific posturing.134 The
processes that courts impose on the submission of expert testimony impose
minimum standards of scientific reliability and force litigants to "own" the
pedigrees and assertions of their experts, shedding light on the relationship
between expert and corporate interests.135 Julia Olson, the lead lawyer in
Juliana, put it bluntly: "Facts are facts and alternative facts are perjury."'3 6
Moreover, the adversarial process provides a useful means to surface and expose
politically or profit-motivated scientific spin.137 And courts' gatekeeping in this
regard can be even more subtle, involving not just decisions about the admission
of specific experts' testimony, but influencing broader issues in litigation. One
insightful interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA explains the decision not to afford deference to the Bush-era EPA as rooted
in the Court's suspicion that the agency's representations of the state of climate
science were politically motivated and unsupported.13 8
132. Dunlap & McCright, supra note 91, at 300-01. See also Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Influence
and seepage: an evidence-resistant minority can affect public opinion and scientific beliefformation, 188
COGNITION 124, 125 (2019) (summarizing social science research into the impacts of the climate
disinformation campaign and concluding that "[a]lthough the direction of causality cannot be
ascertained ... one interpretation is that the efforts of conservative think tanks and Exxon had the intended
effect of shaping public discourse with denialist talking points, thereby delaying meaningful mitigation
efforts.") (citations omitted).
133. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 2, at 329.
134. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 592-96 (1993)
(providing factors to be considered in determining whether an expert's methodology is valid, including
whether the theory or technique used can and has been tested, error ate, etc.).
135. Ryan Hackney, Note, Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat,
40 ENvTL. L. 255, 255-57 (2010) (arguing that application of Daubert standards could prevent admission
of testimony by climate skeptics often held up as experts in the public debate and clarify the state of
climate science).
136. 60 Minutes: "This is No Ordinary Lawsuit," Off Track, Cracking the Code (CBS television
broadcast Mar. 3, 2019) (including an interview by 60 Minutes with Julia Olson, lead attorney in Juliana
v. United States).
137. Thomas 0. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate
Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 60-61 (2001).
138. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REv. 51, 51-54 (2007).
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And courts hearing climate-related cases do not appear to be having
difficulty discerning what constitutes credible climate science.139 Indeed, in
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, the court
demonstrated notable nuance in evaluating claims offered by experts relating to
climate change.14 0 The court applied Daubert flexibly in the context of emerging
climate science to rebuff the automakers' attempt to exclude the testimony of
climate scientists presenting emerging theories about the extent of climate harms
(including where those scientists' predictions were more dire than those offered
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 141 Most tellingly, one of
the automakers' climate-skeptic experts purportedly declined to testify at the last
moment when it became clear that he might be required to reveal his funding
sources. 142
Institutionally, courts provide a forum that is inhospitable to public relations
scientific posturing and thus a means to counter its conversation-distorting
influence. That this is so provides another ationale supporting the need for and
legitimacy of judicial review. The majoritarian product of a pathologized
political and public process may not be understood to be legitimate and may
therefore invite justifiable judicial correction, particularly to fix the pathologized
process itself A number of scholars, building generally from this core concept,
recognize that courts may intervene in a democracy-enhancing capacity when
doing so corrects pathologies in the political process (including those related to
communication and interaction) that prevent the political process from producing
legitimate outcomes. Frank Michelman explains that judicial review is legitimate
and consistent with democracy when it ensures the communicative and
procedural conditions necessary for civic processes to operate in a
jurisgenerative fashion (i.e., influence the development of legitimate law). 143
These conditions include that citizens' participation in the political process can
change their understanding without being "coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a
violation of one's identity or freedom."144 As summarized by one scholar, in
Michelman's view, "[t]he Court ... protects the presuppositions of United States
139. Michael Gerrard, Court Rulings Accept Climate Science, 250 N.Y.L.J. (2013); Maria L. Banda
& Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National Courts: Recent Trends and Developments in
Global Climate Law, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,121, 10,130 (2017).
140. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 310-35 (D. Vt. 2007) (undertaking detailed Daubert analysis of claims
offered by climate experts in litigation).
141. Id. at 318 (noting "[p]laintiffs argue at length that Hansen's theory is unreliable because it has
not been tested by controlled scientific experimentation. It is difficult to imagine a conclusive test for any
theory about the future climate effects of the world's current emissions of greenhouse gases.").
142. Id. at 336 (referencing the late substitution of the automakers' testifying expert); see also Rick
Piltz, Climate contrarian Pat Michaels refused to disclose funding in Vermont court case, CLIMATE
SCIENCE AND POLICY WATCH (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2007/09/19/climate-
contrarian-pat-michaels-refused-to-disclose-funding-in-vermont-court-case/.
143. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494-98 (1988).
144. Id. at 1526-27 (internal citation omitted).
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constitutionalism by ensuring that dialogue between participants of the political
process is free of coercion and exclusion."1 4 5
Jurgen Habermas similarly posits that public discourse and input is
necessary for law to be legitimate. He identifies "presuppositions of
communication that undergird legitimate lawmaking,"14 6 identifying as "the
source of legitimacy" of democratic will-formation "the communicative
presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in various
forms of deliberation and ... procedures that secure fair bargaining
conditions."1 47 In Habermas's view, a public process produces legitimate law
when it consists of "forms of communication" that allow for "filtering reasons
and information, topics and contributions in such a way that the outcome of a
discourse enjoys a presumption of rational acceptability."1 4 8 In describing the
qualities of the requisite communication, Habermas observes:
[T]he success of public communication is ... measured by ... the formal
criteria governing how a qualified public opinion comes about. The
structures of a power-ridden, oppressed public sphere exclude fruitful and
clarifying discussions. The "quality" of public opinion, insofar as it is
measured by the procedural properties of its process of generation, is an
empirical variable. From a normative perspective, this provides a basis for
measuring the legitimacy of the influence that public opinion has on the
political process.149
Notably, while Habermas believes that courts should apply not make law
and criticizes constitutional activism generally,150 he expressly situates judicial
review as important to maintaining the presuppositions of communication
necessary to generate legitimate law. In other words, Habermas understands
judicial review as providing an important procedural means to insure "conditions
for the democratic genesis of laws."15 1 Habermas observes that "The Court's
exercise of judicial review ensures that majoritarian procedures do not violate
communicative presuppositions, and thus secures the 'conditions for the
democratic genesis of laws.' 1 52 He also asserts that "the constitutional court
must work within the limits of its authority to ensure that the process of
lawmaking takes place under the legitimating conditions of deliberative
politics."'53 He goes so far as to endorse "bold constitutional adjudication" as
145. Sultany, supra note 58, at 408-09.
146. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 252 (William Rehg trans., 1998).
147. See id. at 245.
148. Id. at 146.
149. Id. at 310.
150. HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 12-28 (2011)
(explaining Habermas' rejection of values jurisprudence because rather than create law, courts apply
constitutional provisions).
151. Id. at 135 (describing Habermas' "proceduralist" account of the court's constitutional role and
quoting HABERMAS, supra note 146, at 265).
152. Sultany, supra note 58, at 396 (quoting HABERMAS, supra note 146, at 265).
153. HABERMAS, supra note 146, at 242 (emphasis in original).
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"required in cases that concern the implementation of democratic procedure and
the deliberative form of political opinion- and will-formation." 54
The climate disinformation campaign's purposeful and effective distortions
of public communication and, by extension democratic process, resemble the
pathologies identified by Michelman and Habermas. Public relations-oriented
scientific posturing created a pathology in our political process. It exploited the
scientific complexity of climate change, First Amendment speech rights, the
cognitive proclivities of individuals (like politically motivated reasoning), and
political expediency (the policy preferences of many politicians who found easy
cover behind "uncertain" science instead of debating policy) to derail informed
public and political debate. Habermas posited that "[p]ublic opinions that can
acquire visibility only because of an undeclared infusion of money or
organizational power lose their credibility as soon as these sources of social
power are made public."' 5 5 Unfortunately, the sprawl, complexity, and nuanced
methods of the climate disinformation campaign (including obscuring industry
funding and influence through trade associations and other front groups and
exploiting misconceptions about the meaning and role of uncertainty in scientific
inquiry) have prevented the type of cleansing transparency and public awakening
that Habermas predicts.
Yet, while enormously powerful in public fora, public relations-oriented
scientific posturing is weakened inside the courtroom. Courts can be a resource
to help correct the pathologies of public debate-distorting, industry-funded
scientific posturing. This suggests another reason why it is reasonable to view
judicial review of climate cases as residing within existing understandings of the
judicial role and another way in which courts can add value to the democratic
process.
CONCLUSION
The need for judicial engagement on core climate questions does not
disappear even if Congress enacts a robust federal decarbonization statute. Many
have pointed out the "long tail" aspect of climate change, recognizing that
sustained political will is necessary to implement the difficult requirements of
climate law over the long timeframes demanded by the scientific realities of the
phenomenon. 156 Therefore, even if climate harms become apparent enough to
prompt the voting in-generation to (finally) take meaningful legislative action, a
judicial backstop to prevent backsliding and protect interests of future
generations remains important. This Article explains that even relatively
154. Id. at 246.
155. Id. at 311.
156. See generally Eric Biber, The Sting of the Long Tail: Climate Change, Backlash and the
Problem ofDelayed Harm (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1292529,2008) (discussing the
"delayed harm" and associated challenges of climate change); Lazarus, supra note 82, at I185.
2019] 763
ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY
constrained theories of the legitimate role of courts contain powerful arguments
in favor of the judiciary's engagement on core climate cases.
This is instructive as courts rule on threshold jurisdictional questions in the
climate cases, as well as on the merits. Courts evaluating threshold justiciability
questions in climate cases-including standing, displacement, preemption, and
political question-should thus take care that reflexive intuitions about he need
for judicial restraint do not influence the application of those doctrines (or, at
minimum, subject such intuitions to searching scrutiny to assess their validity).
Courts should take similar care when assessing the viability of merits claims in
the climate nuisance cases. A court should not, for example, allow an
unexamined conviction about the need for judicial restraint to drive its
determination of whether a plaintiff has established that particular conduct
constitutes an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. And, when courts reach the merits in a constitutional climate case that
demands careful consideration of the proper constitutional role for courts-for
example, whether courts should recognize a fundamental right to a stable climate
system under the due process clause that supersedes legislative will-courts
should be mindful of the powerful arguments in favor ofjudicial review.
Importantly, the arguments offered herein in support of the legitimacy of
judicial review are climate-specific, which should provide a source of comfort to
courts worried about judicial aggrandizement; courts can engage core climate
issues without adopting a new and more generally applicable or expansive model
for the proper scope of judicial review. Finally, American courts would not be
alone. Recently, in Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands, the Dutch Court of
Appeal rejected the Dutch government's attempt to argue that "[t]he triaspolitica
prohibits judges" from engaging on core questions of climate policy.1 57 The
court ordered the Dutch government to reduce emissions and reasoned that the
order respected the relative roles of the legislature and judiciary because it left it
to the government o decide exactly how emissions should be reduced.15 8
Judicial engagement with core climate cases is thus consistent with
traditional understandings of the role of courts in our constitutional system and
arguably less radical than the alternative-judicial disengagement grounded in
underexamined concern about the need for judicial restraint as our democracy
struggles to survive an existential crisis.
157. Urgenda Found. v. Netherlands, 200.178.245/01, Hague Ct. App. (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocumentid=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610 (denying appeal).
158. Id.
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